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E nsuring public trust in election results has been aconcern since antiquity. The Greeks carried outsenatorial elections not by a simple showing ofhands but by issuing little clay balls to the senators,
who then cast their votes by dropping them into the ap-
propriate pot. Paper ballots were first used by the Ro-
mans; voting forms bearing the candidates’ pre-printed
names were introduced in Australia almost 150 years ago.
The earliest voting machines date back a little more than
100 years, and various types of voting and vote-counting
machines have been used extensively, particularly in the
US. Douglas Jones offers a helpful voting-system history
in “A Brief Illustrated History of Voting” available at
www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/.
Recent cryptographic voting schemes, such as David
Chaum’s,1 VoteHere (www.votehere.com), and Prêt à
Voter2,3 provide strong security and privacy guarantees,
high levels of transparency, and require only a minimum
amount of public trust in voting devices or voting offi-
cials. In these schemes, voter verifiability assures accuracy
and preserves ballot secrecy by allowing voters to verify
that their votes are accurately counted. However, a full
appreciation of such cryptographic voting schemes—on
which an entire election’s validity would depend—
requires a high degree of mathematical sophistication;
experts’ evaluations and assurances might not be enough
to persuade the public to put their trust in such schemes. 
Our ultimate goal is an e-voting system that isn’t
only completely trustworthy—doesn’t lose, add, or alter
ballots, for example, or violate ballot secrecy4—but is
also trusted by voters to have these properties. As a step
toward this goal, we have aimed to develop voting sys-
tems that provide strong security, privacy, and accuracy via
noncryptographic
means, yet retain the
levels of public trust and understanding achieved by exist-
ing manual voting systems.
Given this goal, our approach to our voting systems’
design has of necessity been as much sociotechnical as
technical in that we have deliberately tried—in pursuit of
user acceptance and trust—to retain the familiarity and
simplicity of currently well-accepted devices and voting
processes. As a result, our proposed voting systems retain
some paper use and try to avoid, or at least minimize,
using electronics and computers.
We believe that our proposed voting systems, which
we term scratch-card voting systems, stand a good chance
of retaining the trust level that the UK’s present-day man-
ual voting system enjoys, while providing increased secu-
rity and voter verifiability—voters can confirm that their
paper ballot receipts, or in the case of a more elaborate
scheme, receipts encoding their votes, are entered into
the vote-counting process. In this article, we describe our
designs for these manual voting systems and then use
them as a basis for more efficient voting schemes, some of
which are partially automated.
How trust is gained and lost
Trust is usually gained incrementally, but lost abruptly.
The UK’s existing manual voting system has been used for
many years and received little criticism, aside from some
individual vote-confidentiality issues (discussed later).
The UK public’s current high level of trust in the country’s
voting system stems from its many years of unchallenged
use and the public’s perception that a large volume of votes
can’t be subverted (changed, replicated, or lost) other than
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The authors propose manual voting systems that have
significant security advantages over existing systems, yet
retain the simplicity and familiarity that has led to
widespread acceptance. The authors also discuss ways to
improve efficiency without endangering this public trust.
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through the malicious activities of a large number of indi-
viduals who would all have to act in collusion.
Recently, low voter-turnout levels motivated UK of-
ficials to try alternative voting schemes—postal, tele-
phone, and Internet voting—in the hope that the
convenience of such absentee voting systems would en-
courage more people to vote. The use of postal voting in
recent UK local elections increased voter turnout by 13
percent, but a significant number of voter-fraud allega-
tions surfaced and some were successfully prosecuted.
(Six Birmingham Labour Party members, for example,
were found guilty of committing electoral fraud during
these elections. In his trial summary, Richard Mawrey,
Queen’s Counsel, said the postal voting system would
“disgrace a banana republic.”)
We propose a rather simple, but useful and generally
understandable method to measure a voting system’s
merits, or what we term its insubvertibility—a robustness-
related characteristic assessed by dividing the number of
people needed to achieve such corruption undetected by
the number of votes that could be subverted. (The term
“insubvertibility” is derived from the adjective “insub-
vertible,” that is, incapable of being subverted. Though
not actually in the dictionary, the term seems rather ap-
propriate for our needs.)
Insubvertibility relates directly to how much trust the
voter is expected to place in how few people, and to the
voting process’s transparency. For simplicity, our sug-
gested method of estimating insubvertibility doesn’t dis-
tinguish between the different people who might have to
be trusted—election officials, political representatives,
and technical experts—or encompass difficult-to-assess
factors such as the likelihood of collusion, difficulty of
exploitation, detection risk, and so on. Bev Littlewood
and his coauthors offer a more detailed approach that
measures a voting system’s actual robustness against secu-
rity threats.5
Ill-conceived electronic voting systems, in which a
very small number of people might be able to subvert the
entire election, easily undermine ballot secrecy and insub-
vertibility—we argue these key characteristics should be
maximized in any voting system. Our voting systems’ de-
sign aims, in particular that of maximizing insubvertibility,
contrast with those that guided the developers of several
recent touch-screen voting devices and systems that
turned out to be subvertible in the extreme.6
A fundamental requirement for any e-voting system is
to be trusted, not only trustworthy, by the average voter
(with regard to the act of voting), the electoral officials
and political representatives (with regard to the whole
process of carrying out and scrutinizing vote recording,
tallying, and totaling), and as a whole by the general pub-
lic and the media. We are aware of one study concerning
public trust in e-voting that was based on a small-scale
trial of the TruE-Vote system. The study concluded
“The more people trust in the security and the bet-
ter the usability of the system, the less they will doubt
about the ability to verify the count of the
vote…However, a lot of the variables that correlate
with the trust in verifiability have nothing to do with
the technology itself, but more with the social con-
text in which the new technology is embedded.”7
Acceptance of the deployed system’s trustworthiness by
reputable experts, although necessary, unfortunately
might not be sufficient to engender such trust if these ex-
perts are incapable of explaining the system and the basis
of its claimed trustworthiness in simple and convincing
terms. Realistic test trials might help, providing they in-
volve extensive and expert—but unsuccessful—attempts
at subversion. Moreover, such explanations must be suf-
ficiently persuasive to counteract the effects of any alle-
gations about the system’s trustworthiness made by
individuals or organizations opposed to e-voting—we
suggest this is an as-yet unsolved sociotechnical problem.
Thus, our immediate goal is to improve the UK’s ex-
isting manual voting system—in particular, vote confi-
dentiality, accuracy, and overall system efficiency via the
introduction of some limited forms of automation—
without compromising the system’s insubvertibility, un-
derstandability, and usability.
The UK’s current voting system
The UK’s current manual voting system, similar to the
original Australian scheme, involves the use of paper bal-
lots with the candidates’ names preprinted down a left-
hand column (LHC; see Figure 1). The right-hand
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Figure 1. A conventional UK ballot paper. The left-hand column
(LHC) identifies the candidates and the right-hand column (RHC)
provides a place for the voters to indicate their choice. The
identification number at the bottom of the ballot can be used
should any need arise for a post-election inquiry into the election.
1 – Clark
2 – Wain
3 – Jones
4 – Lloyd
5 – Smith
6 – Evans
7 – Brent
722163903
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column (RHC) provides a corresponding set of boxes in
which voters place marks next to their candidate choices.
Independent election officials and the candidates’ rep-
resentatives, who are guided by a strict legal scheme, su-
pervise the voting process in which voters attend voting
stations or polling places where they’re identified and
given paper ballots on which to mark their votes within
private voting booths. Voters then post their completed
ballots through a slot in a locked, sealed ballot box. When
voting is complete, election officials transport the boxes
under police supervision from the voting stations to a
vote-counting center where voting officials unlock them
and manually count the ballots.
Because voters are preregistered and must cast their
votes at specified voting stations where election work-
ers maintain registered-voter lists as they identify and
hand each voter a paper ballot, voter fraud—such as in-
dividuals attempting to vote more than once or differ-
ent individuals trying to vote using the same
identity—is, at least in principle, easy to detect. We be-
lieve the process’s overall simplicity, the close supervi-
sion of vote casting and counting, and the use of paper
ballots that are kept under seal and re-examined as nec-
essary are what lead the general public and the media to
regard the current system as trustworthy—at least re-
garding its ability to deliver adequately accurate results.
It has given rise to little controversy, compared to that
which has popped up in recent years around the use of
various semi-automated or automated systems in other
countries, especially in the US.
One concern that’s occasionally raised, however, is
vote confidentiality. Present UK voting practice requires
that each paper ballot carry an inconspicuous identifica-
tion number, as Figure 1 shows (the number is actually
printed on the ballot’s reverse side). At each polling sta-
tion, a supervised voting-station official tears ballots out
of a book of sequentially numbered ballots and their cor-
responding counterfoils, stamps the voting stations’ iden-
tification code on each ballot, and records the voter’s
electoral-register number on the counterfoil.
The government assures the public that this proce-
dure’s purpose isn’t to determine individual votes, but
rather to assist any inquiry that might be required after the
election should any allegations of impropriety arise, such
as vote rigging or multiple voting. At present, the public
appears to accept these assurances.
Scratch-card voting systems
As noted earlier, Prêt à Voter2,3 is a cryptographic voter-
verifiable system. In it, automated tellers use decryption
keys to extract encrypted vote values from paper ballots
that voters feed into them to cast their votes. The auto-
mated tellers’ robust anonymizing-mix process decrypts
the ballots as it shuffles them—providing ballot secrecy by
ensuring that any link between the ballots and the final
decrypted votes is lost. Our proposed voting systems
achieve a similar effect to Prêt à Voter’s use of decryption
keys to extract encrypted vote values from paper ballots
without compromising vote secrecy. Our systems, how-
ever, use a very simple and well-known manual process
rather than what is, to most people, a mysterious crypto-
graphic technique.
A simple scratch-card voting scheme
To provide voter verifiability and improve the vote confi-
dentiality provided by the UK’s existing manual system,
we suggest using paper ballots similar to those used in the
Prêt à Voter scheme. In this scheme:
• perforated, two-column paper ballots allow easy sepa-
ration of the candidate name list (in the LHC) from the
column on which voters mark their votes (the RHC);
• the candidate name order randomly varies on each ballot;
• voters randomly choose paper ballots;
• voters detach and destroy the LHC after marking their
choices, retaining the RHCs as their ballot receipts.
In contrast to Prêt à Voter, in which ballots carry
unique cryptographic values, our voting schemes feature
a unique receipt identification number (RIN) printed at
the bottom of the RHC (see Figure 2). The crucial aspect
of our schemes—inspired by Prêt à Voter’s cryptographic
technique—is that the RHC is a scratch card with a small
opaque-coated rectangle that obscures a preprinted code
indicating the order of candidate names (OCN). The
OCN identifies the order in which candidate’s names
were given on the paper ballot’s discarded LHC. The
RIN at the foot of the RHC is printed over the opaque
coating. This coating is scratched off at the vote-counting
center by vote counters—simultaneously destroying the
RIN and revealing the OCN. We stress that the RINs
and OCNs should be totally uncorrelated.
In our scheme and similar to the UK’s existing
process, an election official checks the voter’s identity at
the polling station, scores off the voter’s name in the elec-
toral register, and franks their receipt—to help counter
multiple voting attempts, receipt faking, or chain voting.8
As well as permitting voters to randomly choose
their paper ballots, election officials encourage voters to
scratch off the RINs on random ballots (thereby invali-
dating them) to verify that the revealed OCNs match
the LHC candidate name order. Election officials su-
pervise such random ballot sampling and destruction by
the voters. (We use the term “random” rather casu-
ally—true randomness is most fully ensured by inviting
independent auditing authorities to take a random sam-
ple of the unused paper ballots before, during, and—on
unused ballots—after the voting to perform statistical
checks on the candidate name ordering distribution,
test RIN uniqueness, and check that the revealed
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OCNs match the candidate name ordering in each bal-
lot sampled.)
Before voters cast their votes, an election official pho-
tocopies each RHC with its scratch strip still intact, re-
turning both the original and the copy to the voter as a
ballot receipt that could include a digital signature or
other anticounterfeiting mechanisms. The ballot receipts
don’t reveal voters’ choices because the OCNs are no
longer retrievable. The voter then posts the original
RHC into the ballot box with its scratch strip still intact.
When the vote-casting period ends, the secure ballot
boxes full of RHCs are taken to a vote-counting center.
Immediately before vote counters scratch off the RIN
strips to reveal the hidden OCNs underneath and interpret
the vote values encoded on each RHC, the RHCs with
the RINs and voters’ marks are recorded and published via
a secure Web bulletin board. Voters can use their ballot re-
ceipts to verify that their votes are entered into the vote-
counting process. (If voters report that they’re unable to
verify their receipts, it will prompt electoral officials to
begin an investigation of the situation.)
Vote counters manually scratch off the RINs under
the supervision of election officials and candidates’ repre-
sentatives who ensure that no ballots are lost, corrupted,
or added, and that no attempt is made to undermine vote
anonymity by recording RIN-OCN pairings as one is
scratched off to reveal the other. Ideally, this process
scratches off the RINs and shuffles the RHCs simultane-
ously, mimicking Prêt à Voter’s robust anonymizing
mixes. Vote counters must set aside, for subsequent ex-
amination and re-consideration, damaged RHCs or
those with missing scratch strips. To avoid vote-spoiling
accusations, this is done under the strict supervision of
election officials.
Once the RHCs’ OCNs are revealed, vote counters
manually count the RHCs using a well-supervised vote-
counting process that can, for example, involve first sort-
ing the RHCs into separate piles by OCN, tallying each
pile separately, and then using the codes to determine
how these tallies are to be combined into an overall set of
vote totals for the various candidates.
Given the UK public’s experience of and trust in
scratch cards (which they’re likely to be even more famil-
iar with than paper ballots) and in the act of shuffling play-
ing cards, we believe that our vote-counting process and
indeed the whole voting scheme could gain a level of
trust and acceptance comparable to that enjoyed by the
UK’s current manual scheme since the additional vote
confidentiality it provides should be evident to the gen-
eral public. However, the scratch-card scheme’s advan-
tages over the existing manual scheme aren’t limited to
vote confidentiality. The fact that candidates’ names
aren’t in the same order on each ballot is an additional
benefit, as evidence suggests that a fixed candidate name
order might have an untoward influence on voters.
A possible enhancement is to produce two photocopies
of the RHC at the time the vote is cast: one is returned to
the voter as a receipt, the other posted into a locked and
sealed audit box. As before, voters post the original RHCs
with scratch strips still intact into locked and sealed ballot
boxes. The vote-counting process is the same as before, ex-
cept that independent auditors perform random checks to
ensure that the published receipts on the Web bulletin
board and the photocopied RHCs stored in the audit
boxes correspond to each other. This enhancement is sim-
ilar to the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT),9 in
which voter verification of published RINs supplements
auditor checks that the VVPAT records and the published
RIN list correspond to one another.
A more robust
scratch-card voting system
The basic scratch-card voting scheme and its enhance-
ment described in the previous section have several ap-
pealing features, notably extreme simplicity. They are,
however, somewhat fragile in a few respects:
• Anyone obtaining an RHC can breach secrecy for that
vote, though obtaining the RIN will not in itself iden-
tify a voter.
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Figure 2. A sample scratch-card paper ballot. After voters mark their
vote in the right-hand column (RHC) and discard the left-hand
column (LHC), they hand the RHCs to election officials who
photocopy them with the receipt identification numbers (RINs) still
intact. At the vote-counting center, vote counters scratch off the
RINs, revealing their order of candidate names (OCN) codes.
3 – Jones
5 – Smith
1 – Clark
7 – Brent
4 – Lloyd
6 – Evans
2 – Wain
722163903
(RIN)
LHC RHC RHC RHC
Blank voting slip Countable vote Photocopied receipt
X
3517462
(OCN)
X
722163903
(RIN)
LHC = Left-hand column
OCN = Order of candidate names
RHC = Right-hand column
RIN = Receipt identification number
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• It’s necessary to place significant trust in the process or
mechanism that removes the scratch strips and shuffles
the paper ballots.
We designed a more sophisticated voting scheme to
counter these vulnerabilities. It uses a slightly different
ballot: the LHC contains the random candidate list with a
code identification number (CIN) at the bottom. The
RHC has a scratch strip with a RIN printed over the
CIN instead of an OCN. The RIN and CIN are wholly
independent of each other (see Figure 3).
Before voting, voters can randomly sample RHCs
to verify that the scratched-off RIN reveals a CIN that
matches the CIN at the bottom of the LHC invalidat-
ing the sample RHCs. Using another (intact) paper
ballot in the isolation of the voting booth, voters mark
their ballots to indicate their votes. Instead of discard-
ing the LHCs, voters deposit them into a sealed LHC
ballot boxes within the voting booths. Outside of the
booths, election officials photocopy the RHCs and
voters post their RHCs (the countable votes) into
clearly marked RHC ballot boxes, keeping the copied
RHCs as ballot receipts.
As before, the copied ballot receipt carries informa-
tion about the voter’s choice in “encrypted” form, so
voters can visit a secure Web site to verify that their
RHCs were correctly entered into the tabulation process.
(Such a voting system could also be enhanced through in-
corporation of a VVPAT-style mechanism.)
Independent voting authorities handle the LHCs and
RHCs separately; thus, it’s significantly harder for anyone
to lose or add votes because they would have to lose or
add matching LHCs and RHCs. Moreover, obtaining an
RHC isn’t enough to breach privacy—the correspond-
ing LHC would also have to be obtained.
To tabulate the votes, vote counters scratch off the
RIN strips on the RHCs to reveal the hidden CINs and
match the RHCs with the corresponding LHCs. This
voting scheme has a more robust tabulation process, in-
cluding a more accurate mixing process, and provides un-
conditional secrecy because no mathematical relationship
exists between the RINs and CINs.
Unfortunately, although this scheme gains in terms of
assurance and robustness over our initial scratch-card
scheme, it loses in terms of simplicity, particularly regard-
ing vote tabulation. Indeed, it’s clear that the task of find-
ing matching LHCs and RHCs would be impractical for
large elections, unless the process was automated or car-
ried out only at the constituency level.
From paper to mechanism
We now discuss whether our basic scratch-card voting
scheme’s various characteristics—in particular insub-
vertibility and understandability—can be retained
when various aspects of the scheme are automated to
speed up the vote-casting and counting processes and
reduce their costs. We deal with issues concerning vote
casting and vote counting separately, and concentrate
first on systems that retain the use of paper ballots be-
cause we believe that it’s much easier to maintain pub-
lic trust if paper ballots are retained in some form,
especially in countries where paper ballots are the
trusted norm.
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Figure 3. A paper ballot for a more robust scratch-card scheme. The
ballot uses a code identification number (CIN) rather than an order
of candidate name (OCN) code. The left-hand column (LHC) and
the right-hand column (RHC), after being photocopied with its CIN
still intact, are retained in separate ballot boxes. Vote tabulation
involves revealing the CIN on each RHC and interpreting the now
countable vote by matching it with its corresponding LHC.
3 – Jones
5 – Smith
1 – Clark
7 – Brent
4 – Lloyd
6 – Evans
2 – Wain
023169
(RIN)
LHC RHC
Blank voting slip
RHC
Countable vote
X
513170
(CIN)
RHC
Photocopied receipt
X
023169
(RIN)
LHC
Decoding strip
513170
(CIN)
3 – Jones
5 – Smith
1 – Clark
7 – Brent
4 – Lloyd
6 – Evans
2 – Wain
513170
(CIN)
CIN = Code identification number
LHC = Left-hand column
OCN = Order of candidate names
RHC = Right-hand column
RIN = Receipt identification number
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Retaining paper ballots
Complicated voting structures (such as in the US due to
the number of candidates and choices that a voter must
make, for example), merits using voting machines in con-
nection with paper ballots. We propose a simple machine
that receives a preprinted paper ballot, checks that it’s un-
marked with the RIN scratch strip still intact, and assists
the voter with marking the paper ballot in accordance
with electoral rules. This process ensures that the result-
ing paper ballots are “guaranteed” to be both legible and
valid, speeds up vote casting, and reduces the number of
accidentally damaged paper ballots.
The proposed vote-counting machine’s relative phys-
ical simplicity facilitates detection and demonstration of
malfunctions or corruption, and aids the auditing of the
machine’s design and operation. We believe that the fact
that such machines process checkable printed paper bal-
lots (such as in Figure 2) ensures voters’ willingness to
trust that the voting system isn’t adversely affected by the
use of the vote-counting machines—even if the average
voter has no idea how they actually work.
Paper ballot (RHCs) counting could be done using
one or more special-purpose devices whose design and
operation (preferably electromechanical rather than elec-
tronic) is so simple and visible that officials and candi-
dates’ representatives can readily scrutinize and audit their
operation. In particular, sorting and tallying paper ballots
could be done by machines not unlike conventional, al-
beit old-fashioned, electromechanical Hollerith/IBM
mark-sensed card sorters—to the front end of which is
added a set of brushes that remove the scratch-off RINs.
This type of machine is similar to the vote-counting ma-
chines used and generally accepted—when properly
monitored by trustworthy officials—in some parts of the
US. Such machines can semiautomate the LHC/RHC
matching described in the “A more robust scratch-card
voting system” section.
Electronic vote counting
Major trust concerns arise when you move away from
using paper ballots, either partly (retaining only the
paper ballot receipts) or completely (vote casting and
counting all done electronically). Even if voters believe
that their electronic votes reach the vote-counting cen-
ter safely, providing the public with continued reason
to trust a vote-counting process that isn’t directly visi-
ble is problematic.
For simplicity, in what follows we assume that the
paper ballots are transported to the vote-counting center,
where vote counters record and then scratch off the RINs
to reveal the OCNs (as described in the “Improved
scratch-card voting systems” section) and the RHC in-
formation is read electronically. The votes can then be
counted automatically, taking into account each vote’s
OCN, possibly after having first sorted the ballots into
separate sets according to the OCN, in much the same
way that this process could be carried out manually with
paper ballots.
However, voting machines, such as direct-recording
electronic (DRE) devices, which incorporate in them a
conventional general-purpose computer and operating
system, are problematic and likely to remain controver-
sial. They require a degree of trust that more technically
aware voters are likely to be reluctant to confer, given that
computers and their software pose major problems to
scrutineers and auditors and the present—very under-
standable—concern about software bugs, Trojans,
viruses, and so on.10
Indeed, using such electronic votes requires that on-
line manual checking of the voting and vote-tabulation
processes be replaced or supplemented by prior valida-
tion and testing of the design of sophisticated algorithms
and voting devices, and then ensuring the continued
relevance of the verification results up to and through-
out the voting process. There’s little point in formally
verifying the software design used in an electronic vot-
ing system if you can’t be certain that it hasn’t been re-
placed or interfered with—an example of the
Time-Of-Check-to-Time-Of-Use (TOCTOU) prob-
lem that occurred quite flagrantly with Diebold’s
Global Election Systems DRE machines.11 Ideally,
therefore, these algorithms and devices should be as
simple and as independent of one another as possible,
and susceptible to having their operation completely
checked via examination of their inputs and outputs.
The use of several physically separate, simple, special-
purpose devices would facilitate the making of a case for
their combined trustworthiness from arguments about
their individual trustworthiness.
An alternative approach to e-voting system design is
to use cryptographic mechanisms that make the vote-
counting process highly transparent within ballot se-
crecy constraints and to make the auditing processes
open to scrutiny. Such auditing checks should routinely
be made at various stages of the voting process, espe-
cially immediately after completing the vote counting
and before announcing the election result—not just
when suspicions are raised. Although the computers
and the software involved need not be trusted in such
cryptographic voting schemes, the arguments for the
overall voting system’s trustworthiness are subtle and re-
quire expert knowledge for the public to appreciate
them properly.
Yet another approach involves the use of a VVPAT9 as
an adjunct to a conventional electronic vote casting and
counting system. Such an approach involves ensuring
that the audit trail mechanism, rather than the actual vot-
ing system, is adequately trustworthy, and that recourse
will be had to it whenever necessary. This latter issue will
require officials to carefully scrutinize the audit trail, vote
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casting, and vote-counting operation if low error rates or
subtle attempts at subversion are to be reliably detected.
A n alternative approach to designing a widely accept-able e-voting system is—rather than start, as we have
here, from an existing well-trusted system—to take a
cryptographic e-voting system that experts believe to be
technically trustworthy and simplify the design to the
point where we might expect the general public to accept
it. We are continuing to pursue this approach as well, and
hope that the two approaches might converge.
The ideal end result would be a voting system that
provides high assurances of all aspects of voting accu-
racy and secrecy and needs only minimal trust in the
system components, yet remains sufficiently simple and
understandable by the electorate at large. We recognize
that it might in fact prove impossible to achieve all of
these requirements in a single scheme; in that case, it
will be necessary to forego certain aspects of the re-
quirements. We might not require such high levels of
assurance, for example, or decide that a greater degree
of dependence on certain components or processes is
acceptable. Alternatively, we could determine that
striving for the electorate’s complete understandability
is unreasonable and instead decide to strive for “suffi-
cient” simplicity by providing adequate explanations to
achieve public acceptance and trust. But the justifica-
tion of any such decisions is, like the problem of de-
signing an acceptable voting system, essentially a
sociotechnical problem.
One final point concerns our claim that the systems that
we have described here are sufficiently simple and under-
standable by the electorate at large so as to stand a good
chance of gaining and retaining the degree of trust that is
accorded to present-day manual voting systems in the UK.
This claim requires analysis by psychologists and sociolo-
gists, for example, concerning the relative importance of
the many factors that can affect public trust and how they
might apply to election systems, and proper validation via
extensive test trials designed and supervised by experts. Be-
fore any schemes are deployed, a detailed systems-based
analysis, such as those conducted by Chris Karlof and his
coauthors,12 and Ryan and Peacock,8 will have to be per-
formed to identify vulnerabilities and countermeasures. 
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